The article is devoted to theoretical analysis of the FATF role in AML/CFT regime. Particular emphasis is given to exogenous and endogenous factors of the FATF viability within the framework of AML/CFT regime despite the FATF temporary nature, based on Mandate. The author regards the FATF contribution into AML/CFT regime in accordance with Krasner’s elements of the international regime: principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. The FATF is shown to be the core element of the regime. The author stresses the power, institutional factors and expertise as the basis of the FATF viability and success, and author appeals to three main schools of international regimes: realism, neoliberalism and cognitivism. The author notes that at the initial stage of the FATF development, the economic power and capacity of the G-7 states served as an important factor, which contributed to the diffusion of the FATF standards beyond the FATF. However, in the mid-1990s, the AML/CFT environment began to change, showing signs of an institutional environment. As a result, the FATF faced global governance dilemma: to remain an exclusive club, but be an undemocratic one; or become an inclusive forum, but an ineffective one, as a larger and more heterogeneous membership jeopardizes the capacity of making rules. At the same time, the FATF has a potential to avoid a decision-making deadlock by allowing other actors to participate and providing an opportunity to facilitate communication, reduce information asymmetry and transaction costs. Explaining the viability of the FATF, the author pays special attention to McGinnis and Ostrom’s design principles of robust institutions.